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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
VOLUMW1E 8 FALL, 1972 NmBaER 2
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE AND
OKLAHOMA LAW: A COMPARISON
OmE R. LLY, JR.*
PART It
IMTODUCTION
It is, of course, ultimately a question for the Legislature
to decide whether any part or all of the Uniform Probate
Code shall become the law of Oklahoma. A decision on that
matter should come only after a thorough study of the Code
and a determination that it offers an improvement or improve-
ments over existing law.
It would seem, nonetheless, that such a study should be
undertaken. The Oklahoma statutes relating to testamentary
matters are of ancient vintage. The titles on wills and suc-
cession1 and on probate procedure 2 in large part date from
statehood and before.3 Moreover, in patterning its legislation
on enactments of other states and territories, Oklahoma, as
*Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College
of Law.
: Part II of this article will appear in The Tulsa Law Journal,
Vol. 9, No. 1.
1 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84 (1971).
2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 58 (1971).
For an historical discussion of the laws of Oklahoma and
Indian Territories and of Oklahoma's early statehood, see
Melone, Wills and Succession Laws of Oklahoma, in OKLA.
STAT. Am. tits. 82-84, at XIII (1952).
4 See T. ATrisow, HADBOOK OF Tum LAW OF WLs 26-27 (2d
ed. 1953).
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did California,4 borrowed heavily from the nineteenth century
probate code developed by Professor David Dudley Field.
"Judicial" notice can be taken of social and economic
changes as well as of developments in transportation and com-
munication that have taken place since original thinking went
into what formed the basis of Oklahoma law. These factors
alone would seem sufficient reason to warrant re-examination
of this entire area.
It will be recognized that re-examination by the Legis-
lature would be a voluntary public service on its part. There
is likely no identifiable citizens group with sufficient interest
in probate and succession matters to press for legislative
change. Perhaps the only group interested at all is the probate
bar itself, and the direction of that interest can only be sur-
mised. Certainly there will not be that groundswell for change
that, for example, accompanied adoptions of the Uniform
Commercial Code by the many states.
Consideration of the Code and Oklahoma law will be
undertaken in the format of the Code.
ARTICLE I: GENERAL PROVIsIONs, DEFINITIONSo
AN PROBATE JURISDICTION OF COURT
The Code contains a general fraud section 7 designed to
supplement the protections built into the Code and provide
a remedy that can be pursued outside the estate settlement
process.8 Although the section presumably would not greatly
1 Article V of the Code, entitled "Protection of Persons Under
Disability and Their Property," and Article VIII, "Effective
Date and Repealer," will not be discussed.
0 General definitions of terms, see UiIFoPm PROBATE CODE §
1-201 [hereinafter cited as UPC], will be discussed in con-junction with substantive provisions of the Code to which
they relate and where discussion of them will be meaning-
ful.
7 UPC § 1-106.
s Id., Comment.
[Vol. 8, No. 2
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss2/2
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
add to Oklahoma equity jurisprudence, it has merit. Innocent
purchasers for value are protected. Recovery against the
wrongdoer is not limited in time, but an action against him
must be commenced within two years after discovery of the
fraud. Recovery, including restitution,9 may be had against
any person who benefitted from the fraud, innocent or not,
but only within five years after its commission.
The rules of evidence of the court of general jurisdiction
are adopted by the Code, unless modified by its more specific
provisions.10 The same evidentiary value is accorded a death
certificate'1 as under existing Oklahoma law,'2 and this recog-
nition is extended to other governmental documents.'3 A pre-
sumption of death arises under the Code after five years' un-
explained absence14 rather than after seven as under Oklahoma
law. 5
Insofar as jury trials are concerned, the Code provides:
If duly demanded, a party is entitled to trial by
jury in [a formal testacy proceeding and] any
proceeding in which any controverted question
of fact arises as to which any party has a con-
stitutional right to trial by jury. 6
The bracketed phrase indicates that a state legislature may,
at its option, eliminate that portion without destroying the
0 Recovery solely on a theory of unjust enrichment against
innocent distributees has not always been available. See,
e.g., Lowe Foundation v. Northern Trust Co., 342 Ill. App.
379, 96 N.E.2d 831 (1951). Contra, Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex.
18, 211 S.W.2d 559 (1948); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §
184, comment j at 752 (1937).
10 UPC § 1-107.
11 UPC § 1-107 (1).
12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-324(b) (1971).
18 UPC § 1-107 (2).
14 UPC § 1-107(3).
15 OLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 941 (1971).
'6 UPC § 1-306(a).
1972]
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Code's goal of substantive uniformity. If that portion is omit-
ted the statute seems unnecessary, since it would then apply
only where trial by jury is a constitutional right and could
not be denied even in the absence of a statute granting it.
Enactment of the bracketed portion would expand the right
to jury trial existing under present Oklahoma law. As early
as 1908 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that jury trial was
not a matter of right in probate proceedings, but only of ad-
visory use within the discretion of the court.17 There seems
to be no sound reason to expand the right, as the tendency
of juries to speculate in wills cases has been criticized.18
Persons not formally before the court may be bound under
the Code by judicial orders binding others who may repre-
sent them.19 For example, where there is no conflict of in-
terest, an order binding a fiduciary will bind the persons in
whose behalf he acts.20 The doctrine of virtual representation
is codified as a means of binding unborn or unascertained per-
sons.21 In addition, the use of guardians ad litem to bind in-
terests is discretionary with the court.22 Although similar
results may be reached under common law,23 codification of
these rules seems desirable.
17 Cartwright v. Holcomb, 21 Okla. 548, 97 P. 385 (1908). The
Code preserves the discretionary use of an advisory jury.
UPC § 1-306(b).
18 See, e.g., T. ATlsoN, supra note 4, at 35, 139-40, 269, 533-
34; Bade, Jury Trial in Will Cases in Minnesota, 22 1V&nN.
L. REv. 513 (1938). But see Laube, The Right of a Testator
to Pauperize His Helpless Dependents, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 559,
572-75 (1928).
19 UPC § 1-403 (2).
20 UPC § 1-403 (2) (ii).
21 UPC § 1-403 (2) (iii); see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 183
(1936). Oklahoma has a similar provision in regard to fu-
ture interests in realty. OxLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1147.3 (1971).
22 UPC § 1-403 (4). Oklahoma has a similar provision. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 58, § 710 (1971).
2 See, e.g., Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 670 (1942).
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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ARTICLE I: INTESTATE SUCCESSION AD WILLS
Part 1. Intestate Succession
In the general comment introducing intestate succession,
the Commissioners state that, among the states, "[t]he most
common pattern [of intestate succession] for the immediate
family retains the imprint of history .... "24 They must have
been looking directly at Oklahoma's intestate succession law.
Although dower and curtesy have been abolished 5 and
replaced by the statutory forced share,26 Oklahoma law does
contain features that should be relegated to history.
The minimum share of an Oklahoma surviving spouse
usually is one-third,27 probably a hold-over from dower days,
though it may be less.28 The Model Probate Code2 9 proposed
to increase that minimum to one-half. Although it retains that
minimum,3 0 the Uniform Probate Code expands the survivor's
share in most situations. This is done "to reflect the normal
desire of the owner of wealth as to disposition of his prop-
erty at death, and for this purpose the prevailing patterns
in wills are useful in determining what the owner who fails
to execute a will would probably want."31 The premise seems
reasonable since most Americans die intestate3 2 and probably
24 UPC, art. II, pt. 1, General Comment.
'25 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 214 (1971).
26 OLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 44 (1971).
27 OHLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, First (1971).
28 See text accompanying notes 42-43 infra.
29 See MODEL PROBATE CODE § 22 (a) (1946). This Code gives
the surviving spouse one-half the estate if issue survives
the decedent; five thousand dollars plus one-half of the re-
mainder if there is no issue, but parents or their issue sur-
vive; and the entire estate in other cases. Id.
80 UPC § 2-102(4). UPC § 2-802 defines "surviving spouse."
31 UPC, art. II, pt. 1, General Comment.
32 See generally Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency
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would want the surviving spouse to take the largest part of
their estates.3
Thus, under the Code, the surviving spouse receives the
minimum one-half only if the intestate left issue who are not
also issue of the spouse.34 If there survives the intestate a
parent or issue of him and his spouse, the share of the spouse
is fifty thousand dollars plus one-half of the remainder of
the estate;35 in all other cases the spouse takes the entire
estate.36
The Oklahoma intestate succession statute37 is a horrible
example of legislative drafting. It contains nine canons of
descent dealing with a variety of possible family trees, and
yet all its applications are not clear.3 8 The share of a surviv-
ing Oklahoma spouse is less in all situations than under the
Code. If the intestate is survived by a parent, brother or sister,
but no issue, the spouse's share is one-half;3 only if his sur-
viving relatives are of more remote degree does the spouse
take the entire estate.40 Under the Code, the spouse's share
would not be reduced by a brother or sister surviving the in-
testate.41
If an Oklahoma intestate is survived by more than one
child or the issue of more than one child, the spouse's share
38 A survey of wills in small English estates showed that the
surviving spouse in ninety-seven per cent of the cases took
the whole estate, a life interest in the whole estate, or
other substantial interest. See Warren, The Law of Property
Act, 1922, 21 1IVciH. L. REv. 245, 266 (1923).
34 UPC § 2-102(4). For the Oklahoma treatment, see text ac-
companying notes 42-43 infra.
85 UPC § 2-102 (2), (3). The $50,000 figure is bracketed. See
text following note 16 supra.
36 UPC § 2-102 (1).
.3 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213 (1971).
88 See notes 58-60 infra and accompanying text.
3) OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, Second (1971).
40 OxLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, Fifth (1971).
41 UPC § 2-102 (1). See text acompanying notes 33-35 supra.
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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of his estate is one-third.4 2 But even that share may be re-
duced if the intestate is survived by issue of a marriage prior
to that with his surviving spouse. In such a case, the spouse
will be entitled to the appropriate share of all property ac-
quired during coverture with the intestate, but as to that
property not so acquired the spouse is entitled to only a child's
share.43
If an Oklahoma intestate is not survived by a spouse, is-
sue, parent or sibling, the search for the next of kin can be
unending; 44 his property escheats to the state only if no kin-
dred of any degree can be found.4 5 Under the Code the search
for a next of kin ceases with grandparents or their issue;4 6
no tracing through great-grandparents is allowed and, if that
is required to find the next of kin, the estate instead escheats
to the state.47
Oklahoma succession law also has some anomalies. Al-
though not a community property state, it utilizes the con-
cept.48 If the intestate leaves no issue, all property acquired
by joint industry of the spouses during coverture goes to the
survivor to the exclusion of relatives.4 9 If the survivor dies
intestate, the joint-industry property remaining in his estate
passes equally to the heirs of each spouse,50 though the sur-
vivor may will that property freely or otherwise dispose of
42 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, First (1971).
43 Id. For the Code treatment, see text acompanying note 34
supra.
4 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, Sixth (1971).
45 OKLA. STAT. lit. 84, § 213, Ninth (1971).
46 UPC § 2-103 (4).
47 UPC § 2-105.
48 See Heirs, Etc., of Payne v. Seay, 478 P.2d 889, 896 (Okla.
1970); In re Keith's Estate, 298 P.2d 423, 425 (Okla. 1956).
49 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, Second (1971).
50 Id.
51 Heirs, Etc., of Payne v. Seay, 478 P.2d 889, 896 (Okla. 1970);
In re Griffin's Estate, 199 Okla. 676, 189 P.2d 933 (1947).
19721
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it during his lifetime.5 1 Thus it may be necessary to compute
two estates for an Oklahoma decedent.52
The ancestral property doctrine and two of its variations
are imbedded in Oklahoma law. Where next of kin of equal
collateral degree are entitled to an estate, those who claim
"through the nearest ancestors must be preferred to those
claiming through an ancestor more remote."5 3 In addition, the
surviving parent of a minor intestate who has never married
is prevented from sharing in property the minor inherited
from the predeceased parent.5 4 Finally, "[k]indred of the half-
blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood in the
same degree, unless the inheritance come to the intestate by
descent, devise or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which
case all those who are not of the blood of such ancestors must
be excluded from such inheritance."5 5 The Uniform Probate
Code eliminates the ancestral property doctrine both as to
whole-56 and half-blood"T relatives.
Even though the Oklahoma succession statute is drafted
to apply to a dozen or more specific family situations, in at
least one instance its application is not clear because of an
inadequate definition of "representation." The law provides
that "[i]nheritance or succession by right of representation
takes place when the descendants of any deceased heir take
the same share or right in the estate of another person that
their parents would have taken if living . . ... I The first
52 Such a computation seems to be required under similar,
but not identical language where issue of a prior marriage
survives. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
53 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, Sixth (1971).
54 OIKA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, Seventh, Eighth (1971).
5 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 222 (1971). A whole blood is preferred
as administrator over a half-blood also entitled. OIKLA. STAT.
tit. 58, § 123 (1971).
16 See U'PC § 2-103.
57 UPC § 2-107.
58 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 228 (1971).
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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canon of the succession statute,59 after providing for the sur-
viving spouse, says, "but if there be no child of the decedent
living at his death, the remainder goes to all of his lineal
descendants; and if all the descendants are in the same de-
gree of kindred to the decedent they share equally, otherwise
they take according to the right of representation ... " Where
does representation begin? Does it begin with the intestate's
deceased children, so that all lineals more remote take by rep-
resentation? Or, do the nearest lineals take per capita, with
only those more remote taking by representation? The Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma has not answered these questions.6 0
The Uniform Probate Code "assures that the first and princi-
pal division of the estate will be with reference to a genera-
tion which includes one or more living members," with only
those heirs more remote taking by representation from that
generation.6 1
Adoption was unknown to the English common law. Since
mid-nineteenth century American states h a v e recognized
adoption and various succession rights based on the status
created.62 Oklahoma's most recent legislation is the Uniform
Adoption Act,6 enacted in 1957. A reasonable interpretation
of that Act permits the conclusion that, for intestate succes-
sion purposes, the adopted child is to be treated as if he were
a natural child of his adoptive parents where inheritance from
them or through them from ascendant or collateral kin is in
issue.64 The adoptive parents expressly are entitled to inherit
from and through the child."" The inheritance rights of the
59 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213, First (1971).
60 1 R. HUFF, OKLAHOMA PROBATE LAW AN PRACTICE § 35, at
31 (1957). Section 35 of Huff's work utilizes thirty-four dia-
grams to illustrate the possible applications of OKLA. STAT.
tit. 84, § 213 (1971).
61 See UPC § 2-106, Comment.
62 See T. AnowsoNx, supra note 4, at § 23.
63 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 60.1-.23 (1971).
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child's other ascendant or collateral "adoptive kin" are not
specifically spelled out in the Act, though it does state that
... all the rights, duties and other legal consequences
of the natural relation of child and parent shall . . .
exist between such adopted child and the adoptive
parents adopting such child and the kindred of the
adoptive parents.06
On the other hand, the natural parents, "unless they are the
adoptive parents or the spouse of an adoptive parent," have
no intestacy rights in the child's estate.0 7 The Act does not,
however, specifically deal with the intestacy rights of the
other "natural" kin, ascendant or collateral, of the child. Nor
does it exclude the child from taking by intestacy from his
natural parents, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
seem inclined to permit him to do so.0 8
Under the Uniform Probate Code, intestacy problems re-
lating to an adopted status seem troublesome since it may
be necessary to construe as many as seven provisions in the
Code to resolve them.69 The solutions to those problems, how-
ever, do seem to be uniform. The Code provides:
If . . . a relationship of parent and child must
be established to determine succession by, through,
or from a person,
(1) an adopted person is the child of an
adopting parent and not of the natural parents
except that adoption of a child by the spouse of
a natural parent has no effect on the relationship
between the child and that natural parent. 0
66 Id. (emphasis added).
67 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16(2) (1971).
68 Stark v. Watson, 359 P.2d 191, 196-97 (Okla. 1961) (dictum);
cf. Stein v. Arney, 42 OKLA. B. Ass'N J. 1604 (Ct. App. 1971).
69 See UPC § § 1-201 (3) ("child" defined), 1-201 (21) ("issue"
defined), 1-201 (28) ("parent" defined), 2-102 (share of the
spouse), 2-103 (share of heirs other than surviving spouse),
2-106 (representation), 2-109 (meaning of child and related
terms).
70 UPC § 2-109 (1) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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If the "by, through, or from" language in this provision is
given its "fullest effect,"7' 1 it seems reasonable to conclude
that all the natural relationships which existed before the
adoption are dissolved by it, and that "natural" relationships
are created by law for the adoptee as if he had been a "na-
tural" child of his adopting parents. Such an interpretation
seems desirable since there can be no "stranger to the adop-
tion" where intestacy is concerned.72
Illegitimates are accorded greater rights under the Code
than by Oklahoma law. Under the latter, an illegitimate in-
herits from his mother,73 and she from him.74 However, he
does not represent his mother in inheritance from her lineals
or collaterals unless his natural parents marry and he is ac-
knowledged by or is adopted into the family of his natural
father.7 5 On the other hand, the heirs of the mother of an
illegitimate may inherit from him. 0 The provision of the Code,
that an illegitimate is a child of his mother for purposes of
succession by, through, or from a person,77 seems fairer than
Oklahoma law. It is difficult to justify allowing the mother's
heirs to succeed to an illegitimate's estate but deny him the
right to represent her unless she marries his natural father.78
Furthermore, his mother's relatives could by will deny the
illegitimate participation in their estates.
In Oklahoma a witnessed writing acknowledging pater-
nity permits an illegitimate to take by intestacy from his
71 This may be the intended meaning. See Uniform Probate
Code § 2-110, Comment (3d working draft, November, 1967).
72 It is recognized that other conclusions can be reached. Taken
together, the seven sections of the Code, see note 69 supra,
do not constitute model legislative drafting.
73 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 215 (1971).
74 OiKA. STAT. tit. 84, § 216 (1971).
75 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 215 (1971).
76 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 216 (1971).
7 UPC § 2-109.
78 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
19721
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father,79 but representation of his father is allowed the il-
legitimate only on the same basis as of his mother.8 0 Under
the Code participation in a marriage ceremony by his natural
parents before or after the child's birth legitimizes him for
all succession purposes, even though the attempted marriage
is void.8 1 Furthermore, paternity and full succession rights
of an illegitimate can be established by adjudication before
or, by clear and convincing proof, after the father's death.82
Succession rights from an illegitimate for the father and his
kindred, however, are not created by adjudication unless the
father has openly treated the child as his and has not refused
him support.8 3
Advancements are recognized in Oklahoma and by the
Code, though there are differences in coverage and detail.
Only lineal descendants can be affected by an advancement
in Oklahoma;8 4 the Code extends advancements to anyone who
becomes an intestate's heir, including his spouse and col-
laterals.8 5 Proof of an advancement under the Code is limited
to a written declaration of the decedent contemporaneous to
the property transfer or to a written acknowledgement of the
donee8 6 In addition to proof by these methods, an Oklahoma
court could find an advancement "if expressed in the gift"
or "if charged in writing by the decedent.187 The more strin-
gent proof requirements under the Code have the healthy ef-
fect of preventing speculation as to the nature of a transaction
many years after it took place.
If in an Oklahoma advancement a value is expressly
placed on the property so transferred, that value must be
79 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 215 (1971).80 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
81 UPC § 2-109 (2) (i).
82 UPC § 2-109 (2) (ii).
83 Id.
84 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 223 (1971).
86 UPC § 2-110; id., Comment.
86 UPC § 2-110.
87 OLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 225 (1971).
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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utilized in computing distribution of the intestate's estate"8
regardless of the fair market value of the property. Valuation
of an advancement under the Code is made as of the time
the heir came into possession or enjoyment of the property
or the death of the person who made the advancement, which-
ever first occurs.8 9 In Oklahoma a person entitled to a portion
of an intestate's estate by representation of a parent who re-
ceived an advancement from the decedent is charged with
that advancement in distribution of the estate; 0 such a prac-
tice under the Code is not permitted unless the declaration
or acknowledgement of the advancement provides otherwise.2 '
Analogous to problems of representation in advancements
are those of debts owed the decedent by persons who would
have been his heirs. The Code provides that "[a] debt owed
to the decedent is not charged against the intestate share of
any person except the debtor. If the debtor fails to survive
the decedent, the debt is not taken into account in computing
the intestate share of the debtor's issue."92 This is the majority
view, 3 and though not compelled by statute appears to be
the position that would be taken by Oklahoma courts.94
Building on the rationale underlying the Uniform Simul-
taneous Death Act,9 5 the Uniform Probate Code provides that
"[a]ny person who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours
is deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of
homestead allowance, exempt property and intestate succes-
sion . . . ." If the times of death of either or both and that
88 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 226 (1971).
89 UPC § 2-110.
90 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 227, 228 (1971).
91 UPC § 2-110.
92 UPC § 2-111.
1) See T. ATuisox, supra note 4, at 790.
94 See Nelson v. Huckins, 183 Okla. 325, 82 P.2d 811 (1938)
(construction of will terms).
1r See OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 1001-08 (1971).
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the intestate was survived by 120 hours cannot be established,
failure to have survived is presumed.97 These provisions are
not to be given effect, however, if their application would
cause the intestate's estate to escheat to the state08 There are
no provisions comparable to these Code rules in Oklahoma
law.99
Part 2. Elective Share of Surviving Spouse
The common law for centuries has protected a surviving
spouse from complete disherison; the principal protections
were the estates ot dower and curtesy.
In abolishing those estates, 00 Oklahoma substituted other
protections. The surviving spouse of an intestate is given an
outright share of his estate ranging from a minimum child's
share to the entire estate, depending on who his heirs are
and the nature of the property in the estate.110 The surviving
spouse of a testator is protected by the "forced share" con-
cept: if the testator leaves his surviving spouse less than would
be his share by intestacy, the spouse may elect to take the
intestate share in opposition to the will. 102
It is recognized, however, that these protections can be
of limited effect since the share provided pertains only to the
99 Oklahoma does provide that
if the decedent has left a surviving child, and the issue
of other children, and any of them, before the close of
administration, have died while under age and not having
been married, no administration on such deceased child's
estate is necessary, but all the estate which such deceased
child was entitled to by inheritance must, without admin-
istration, be distributed in accordance with the laws of
descent and distribution of this State.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 631 (1971).100 OKiA. STAT. tit. 84, § 214 (1971).
101 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213 (1971). See notes 27-28, 37-43,
48-52 supra and accompanying text.
10 2 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 44 (1971). As to the testator's prop-
erty not acquired by joint industry during coverture, how-
ever, the forced share is limited to one-half. See id.
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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decedent's administered estate. By a concerted effort before
death, a spouse may effectively disinherit his surviving spouse
through the use of will substitutes such as gifts, inter vivos
trusts, joint survivorship transfers, insurance beneficiary des-
ignations, and the like.
In order to combat spousal disinheritance of this type,
judicial doctrines have been developed to enlarge the admin-
istered estate. In Courts v. Aldridge'0 3 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found a transfer "illusory" where the grantor did not
intend to divest himself of ownership, control and enjoyment
of property. It held:
A resulting trust arises where the legal estate in
property is disposed of, conveyed, or transferred, but
the intent appears or is inferred from the terms of
the disposition, or from acompanying facts and cir-
cumstances, that the beneficial interest is not to go
to or be enjoyed with the legal title. In such a case
a trust is implied or results in favor of the grantor
whom equity deems to be the real owner.'0
In the recently decided case of Sanditen v. Sanditen'0 5 the
court recognized the existence in Oklahoma of an action in
favor of a spouse on allegations that the other spouse fraudu-
lently gave jointly acquired property0" away so that she
would not inherit it at his death as provided in the statute
on descent and distribution. 0 7 The court thus held:
103 190 Okla. 29, 120 P.2d 362 (1941).
104 Id. at 30, 120 P.2d at 364, quoting Warren v. Dodrill, 173
Okla. 634, 636, 49 P.2d 137, 140 (1935).
106 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972).
106 The Oklahoma court has defined "separate property" as that
acquired by gift, devise or descent, or by exchange of a
spouse's individual property. "[A]ll property, not falling
within the definition of separate property, acquired after
marriage by the labor of either spouse, is ... deemed to be
acquired by the labor of both spouses." Heirs, Etc., of Payne
v. Seay, 478 P.2d 889, 896 (Okla. 1970).
107 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213 (1970).
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While we do not agree with plaintiff's argument
that a wife has a vested interest in jointly acquired
property, we do find, by this opinion, that a married
man cannot make gifts of jointly acquired property
during his lifetime without the consent or knowledge
of his wife where the transfer is in fraud of the wife's
marital rights. 0 8
The court has, nonetheless, adhered to the position that a
spouse may in his lifetime deal with his separate property
as he sees fit, except in defraud of creditors. 00
As to domiciliaries," 0 the Uniform Probate Code provides
that the surviving spouse of a testator or an intestate'" "has
a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of
the augmented estate ....
The augmented estate is computed as follows: To the net
distributable estate" 3 are added two categories of property.
In the first category are inter vivos transfers other than to
the spouse made by the decedent during the marriage which
are in the nature of will substitutes in that he continues to
have some benefits in or controls over the property trans-
ferred.1 4 Also included are transfers "made within two years
of death ... to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any
one donee in either of the years exceed $3,000."1"6
108 496 P.2d at 367.
109 Irvin v. Thompson, 500 P.2d 283 (Okla. 1972); Farrell v.
Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159, 74 P. 96 (1903).
110 "It is especially important that states limit the applicability
of rules protecting spouses so that only estates of domicil-
iary decedents are involved." UPC, art. II, pt. 2, General
Comment; see UPC § 2-201 (b).
"'See UPC § 2-202 (2).
112 UPC § 2-201 (a) (emphasis added).
11s "[T]he estate reduced by funeral and administration ex-
penses, homestead allowance, family allowances and ex-
emptions, and enforceable claims . . . ." UPC § 2-202.
"4 See UPC § 2-202 (1); UPC § 2-202, Comment.
115 UPC § 2-202 (1) (iv).
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In the second category are assets of the surviving spouse
derived from the decedent before or after the marriage and
those which come to the spouse because of the decedent's
death.116 This latter group would include the spouse's bene-
ficial interest in any inter vivos trust created by the decedent;
property the decedent appointed to the spouse; insurance pro-
ceeds on the decedent's life, and the commuted value of an-
nuity rights, attributable to premiums paid by him117 and
which vest in the spouse; the commuted value of pension, dis-
ability, death benefit, or retirement rights which vest in the
spouse because of the decedent's disability or death; and the
value of community property rights the spouse might have
in property formerly owned by the decedent.118 Also included
in the second category is property the spouse derived from
the decedent and in turn has given away in a will-like trans-
action.1 9
Property includable in the second category is valued as
of the date it irrevocably vested in the spouse or of decedent's
death, whichever first occurs. 120 Furthermore, the Code creates
a rebuttable presumption that all the spouse's property and
that transferred by him was derived from the decedent and
places the burden on the spouse to show otherwise. 121
The augmented estate specifically does not include federal
social security benefits, 122 property transfers made with the
spouse's written consent or joinder, and insurance proceeds
and the like payable to anyone other than the spouse.'2
111 See UPC § 2-202 (3).
117 "Premiums paid by the decedent's employer, his partner,
a partnership of which he was a member, or his creditors,
are deemed to have been paid by the decedent." UPC §
2-202(3) (i).
118 See UPC § 2-202 (3).
"9 See id.; id., Comment.
120 UPC § 2-202 (3) (ii).
121 UPC § 2-202 (3) (iii).
122 UPC § 2-202 (3) (i).
123 UPC § 2-202 (2).
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After items includable in the augmented estate are de-
termined and valued, the spouse's one-third share is reduced
by the value of property in the augmented estate which came
to the spouse by testate or intestate succession or other means
and which has not been renounced, including second-category
property 24 determined to be a part of that estate. 26 If a bal-
ance is still due the spouse, 26 contributions from other recipi-
ents of portions of the augmented estate can be had to satisfy
the one-third share. 1 7
The Commissioners state that, "[a]lthough the system
described . . . may seem complex, it should not complicate
administration of a married person's estate in any but very
unusual cases." 2 Several features of the system lead them
to this conclusion. First, the surviving spouse has the burden
of asserting an election,1 29 "as well as the burden of proving
the matters which must be shown in order to make a suc-
' See text acompanying notes 116-19 supra.
1 25 See UPC § 2-207 (a).
126 The spouse probably would withdraw his demand unless
a balance were due him at this point. See UPC § 2-205 (c).
"7See U-PC § 2-207 (a). Contribution can be had only from
original recipients of augmented estate property and their
donees, to the extent the donees still have the property
or its proceeds, see UPC § 2-207 (c), and who were served
with notice of the hearing on the election, see UPC § 2-
205 (b). Contributions are equitably apportioned, see U.PC
§ 2-207(b), but in no case is a contribution greater than
it would have been if relief had been sought against all
possible contributors, see UPC § 2-205(d). The property
or its value may be given up. See UPC § 2-207 (c). An
order for contribution may be enforced in the courts. See
UPC § 2-205 (e).
'2 UPC, art. II, pt. 2, General Comment (emphasis in original).
129 See UPC § 2-205 (a). A petition for election must be filed
within six months of publication of notice to decedent's
creditors, though the court may extend that time for cause
shown. Id.
[Vol. 8, No. 2
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss2/2
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
cessful claim to more than he or she has received."' 30 A sec-
ond feature that should reduce the number of cases in which
an election will be made is that of requiring the spouse to
off-set all his property attributable to the decedent. 3 1 Finally,
the expanded effectiveness and use of waivers and releases
permitted under the Code would allow estate planners to
head off election litigation. 32 Nonetheless, the system does
provide realistic protection against disinheritance of the
spouse.133
The Code provides:
The right of election of a surviving spouse and the
rights of the surviving spouse to homestead allowance,
exempt property and family allowance, or any of
them, may be waived, wholly or partially, before or
after marriage, by a written contract, agreement or
waiver signed by the party waiving after fair dis-
closure. 84
Such a provision would have the effect of broadening the
effectiveness of contractual arrangements over that of current
Oklahoma law. Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
upheld the validity of antenuptial waivers of survivors' elec-
tion rights, 35 it has refused to uphold postnuptial agreements
purporting to do the same thing.136 The court has in addition
held that an antenuptial waiver of the widow's allowancedmT
is against public policy and void. 38
130 UPC, art. 31, pt. 2, General Comment. See text accompany-
ing note 121 supra.
111 See UPC, art. II, pt. 2, General Comment. See notes 110-23
supra and accompanying text.
132 See UPC, art. H, pt. 2, General Comment. See notes 134,
139 infra and accompanying text.
181 See UPC § 2-202, Comment.
134 UPC § 2-204.
8r E.g., Talley v. Harris, 199 Okla. 47, 182 P.2d 765 (1947).
138 E.g., Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 278, 243 P.2d 998 (1951).
1'3 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 314 (1971).
188 In re Rossiter's Estate, 191 Okla. 342, 129 P.2d 856 (1942).
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An agreement to waive "all rights," or equivalent lan-
guage, under the Code applies to intestate, election, home-
stead, exempt property, an d family allowance rights.139
Oklahoma law does not seem to go that far. In Pence v. Cole14 0
the court had to construe an antenuptial agreement in light
of a claim of homestead rights in the surviving spouse. Al-
though homestead rights were not specifically mentioned, the
agreement did purport to settle rights of the spouses in each
others property, which rights were stated to be "in lieu of...
rights ... under the law as widower."' 41 The court held that
homestead is an individual right, not an interest in a testator's
property, and that a devise of the homestead passed subject
to the survivor's rights.142
While in Oklahoma the surviving spouse takes under suc-
cession law unless an election to take under the will is made,143
the reverse is true under the Code.144 The latter provides that
the spouse's decision to take an elective share does not de-
prive him of benefits under the will or by intestacy unless
those benefits are expressly renounced.14 Furthermore, the
spouse is entitled to exempt property, homestead and family
allowances whether or not he chooses the elective share or
renounces will benefits, although a testator may state that
the will benefits are in lieu of those rights. 46 In Oklahoma,
whether the spouse must elect between will benefits or rights
189 See UPC § 2-204. The same construction applies in the
case of "a complete property settlement entered into after
or in anticipation of separation or divorce .... " See id.
140 85 Okla. 69, 205 P. 172 (1922).
141Id. at 71, 205 P. at 173.
42 Id. at 76, 205 P. at 178; see OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 2; tit. 58,
§ 311 (1971).
143 1 R. HurF, OLAHIoiA PROBATE LAW Am PRACTICE 347
(1957).
144See UPC § 2-205 (a).
145UPC § 2-206 (a). These benefits are charged against the
elective share. See UPC §§ 2-201, -202, -207 (a).
146 UPC § 2-206(b).
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conferred by law depends upon the express or implied inten-
tion of the testator; if intention cannot be ascertained, will
benefits are presumed to be in addition to rights conferred
by law.147 Under both systems the right of election is per-
sonal to the surviving spouse,148 although it may be exercised
by order of court in the case of an incompetent.149
Part 3. Spouse and Children Unprovided For in Wills
In Oklahoma special provision for a spouse omitted from
a will is unnecessary because the forced share and the spouse's
intestate share of the decedent's estate are the same.150 That
probably would never be true under the Code. The Code
makes no special provision for a spouse who married t h e
testator prior to the execution of his will; that spouse can
only assert his elective share rights. However, the Code does
provide that a spouse who married the testator after the execu-
tion of his will may receive the share he would have taken
under the intestate succession statute.'5 It is probable that
an intestate share would be greater than a one-third share
in the augmented estate. 52 The right to the intestate share
is not absolute however, but may be taken
... unless it appears from the will that the omission
was intentional or the testator provided for the spouse
by transfer outside the will and the intent that the
transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is
shown by statements of the testator or f r o m the
amount of the transfer or other evidence. 53
If the quoted conditions are met, the omitted spouse could
147 See York v. Trigg, 87 Okla. 214, 209 P. 417 (1922).
148 U-PC § 2-203; Hulen v. Truitt, 188 Okla. 296, 108 P.2d 170
(1940).
111 See UPC § 2-203; Turner v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
262 P.2d 897 (Okla. 1953).
150 See ORLA. STAT. tit. 84, § § 44, 213 (1971).
151 See UPC § 2-301.
152 See UPC §§ 2-102, -201 (a), -202.
U3 UPC § 2-301.
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still assert his right to an elective share. Overall, however,
the provision for an omitted spouse should tend to reduce
the number of cases in which an election will be made.154
Insofar as children of a testator born after the execution
of his will are concerned, clarity of legislation is the princi-
pal difference between the Code and Oklahoma law. The
Code expressly covers children adopted after execution, 15 but
Oklahoma law has been interpreted to cover them as well.150
In either system the child's share is that which he would
have received had the testator died intestate.15 7 An Oklahoma
child may claim that share if he is "unprovided for by any
settlement, and neither provided for nor in any way men-
tioned in [the] will ....,158 A Code child will take unless
(1) it appears from the will that the omission was
intentional;
(2) when the will was executed the testator had
one or more children and devised substantially all his
estate to the other parent of the omitted child; or
(3) the testator provided for the child by trans-
fer outside the will and the intent that the transfer
be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by
statements of the testator or from the amount of the
transfer or other evidence.1 9
The second quoted sub-section merits consideration. In the
case of a will not ambiguous on its face, Oklahoma law 00
might allow an afterborn child to disturb the probable plan
of the testator that provision for children would be made by
his surviving spouse.
114 See UPC § 2-301, Comment.
155 UPC § 2-302 (a).
16 Alexander v. Samuels, 177 Okla. 323, 58 P.2d 878 (1936).
The 1957 adoption statute, see OXLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16
(1971), should not require a different interpretation.
157 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 131 (1971); UPC § 2-302 (a).
158 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 131 (1971).
1i9 UPC § 2-302 (a).
160 See text accompanying note 158 supra.
[Vol. 8, No. 2
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss2/2
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
The taking of an intestate share by a child born before
the execution is narrowly limited under the Code to the situ-
ation where the parent fails to provide for the child in the
will solely because he believes the child to be dead.161 Okla-
homa, however, has a pretermitted issue statute. 'When any
testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children,
or for the issue of any deceased child unless it appears that
such omission was intentional . . ." the person omitted must
be given his intestate share.162 The court has held "that the
gist of the statute is an 'omission to provide' rather than omis-
sion to name .... "163 Thus a statement in a testator's will
that he has no children, when indeed the opposite is true,'"
or a statement specifically naming, but not providing for, is-
sue living at the time of execution of the will 1o appears suf-
ficient to find an intentional omission. On the other hand the
mere naming of one issue to identify another heir does not
appear to preclude the former from an intestate share.1 66 If
Oklahoma follows the California interpretation of an identical
statute167 that the testator's disinheritance in his will of a
child, who predeceased him, precludes that child's unmention-
ed issue from receiving an intestate share,168 the probable
plan of a testator that provision for his issue would be made
by his surviving spouse would not be disturbed. Nonetheless,
as it has been the source of considerable litigation, the Okla-
homa statute appears ripe for legislative review.
161 See UPC § 2-302 (b).
162 OiLA. STAT. fit. 84, § 132 (1971).
16 In re Estate of Daniels, 401 P.2d 493, 496 (Okla. 1965),
citing In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973
(1937).
'"See O'Neill v. Cox, 270 P.2d 663 (Okla. 1954).
165 See Pease v. Whitlatch, 397 P.2d 894 (Okla. 1964).
166In re Estate of Daniels, 401 P.2d 493 (Okla. 1965).
167 Ch. 72, § 17, [1850] Cal. Stat. 179 (now CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 90 (West 1956)).
168 See In re Barter's Estate, 86 Cal. 441, 25 P. 15 (1890).
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Part 4. Exempt Property and Allowance
The recognized purpose of exemptions and allowances is
to provide some protection to the surviving spouse and cer-
tain children of a decedent from claims of unsecured credi-
tors and persons who may take under his will. Nominally at
least, Oklahoma and the Code have the same protections;
there is, however, some difference in detail and there can be
considerable difference in the value of those protections.
Homestead allowance under the Code is limited to five
thousand dollars. 169 It is exempt from and has priority over
all claims against the estate and is in addition to all other
benefits that may be claimed unless the decedent's will pro-
vides otherwise.170 The Commissioners recognize that the need
for uniformity among the states in the family protection area
is not great.1 71 A stated dollar figure is chosen primarily as
it relates to summary handling of small estates, 7 2 and an
alternative provision is suggested for constitutional homestead
states. 73
The Constitution of Oklahoma provides that:
The homestead of any family in this State, not
within any city, town, or village, shall consist of not
more than one hundred and sixty acres of land, which
may be in one or more parcels, to be selected by the
owner. The homestead within any city, town, or vill-
age, owned and occupied as a residence only, shall
169 UPC § 2-401. The $5,000 figure is suggested only. See UPC,
art. II, pt. 4, General Comment.
170 See UPC § 2-401.
17 See UPC, art. II, pt. 4, General Comment.
17 2 See id.; UPC § 2-401, Comment. See U!PC, art. III, pt. 12.
173 The value of any constitutional right of homestead in
the family home received by a surviving spouse or child
shall be charged against that spouse or child's homestead
allowance to the extent that the family home is part of
the decedent's estate or would have been but for the
homestead provision of the constitution.
UPC § 2-401A.
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consist of not exceeding one acre of land, to be se-
lected by the owner: Provided, That the same shall
not exceed in value the sum of five thousand dollars,
and in no event shall the homestead be reduced to
less than one-quarter of an acre, without regard to
value; And Provided Further, That in case said home-
stead is used for both residence and business purposes,
the homestead interest therein shall not exceed in
value the sum of five thousand dollars .... 1,4
The mere statement of the law makes it apparent that wide
disparity in dollar value will exist among Oklahoma home-
steads. The disparity becomes more apparent when it is rec-
ognized that the homestead right carries with it the right to
profits from minerals extracted from homestead land.175 It
is, however, within the power of the legislature to provide a
simple, equal homestead right'7 6 in the pattern of the Code.
The Code also uses a dollar figure for exempt property.
The surviving spouse, if any, or the children of a decedent,
including adults, 177 are entitled to a net value of thirty-five
hundred dollars in household furniture, automobiles, furnish-
ings, appliances and personal effects.178 The exempt property
allowance may be brought up to full value by including other
assets of the estate and is subject to abatement only to pay
homestead and family allowances. The right is in addition
to other benefits which may be claimed unless the decedent's
will provides otherwise.179
Oklahoma has chosen to list exempt property and divide
it into two categories. In the first category are items not con-
174 OKLA. CONST. art. XII, § 1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 2 (1971)
is identical.
17 See Heyser v. Frankfort Oil Co., 316 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 824 (1963).
17 6 See OKLA. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
177 The Code homestead allowance is limited to the surviving
spouse, if any, or minor children. See UPC § 2-401.
'
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sidered assets of a decedent's estate. Included are family pic-
tures, pews and burial lots, books not exceeding one hundred
dollars in value, the family's wearing apparel, provisions and
fuel for the family for one year, and all household and kitchen
furniture.180 In the second category are listed items that are
subject to be sold only if necessary to pay expenses of the
last illness, funeral charges and expenses of administration.181
The list, which consists largely of domesticated animals and
implements of husbandry, seems primarily designed to pro-
tect farmers, though it does include some wage protection.182
Most Oklahomans might be surprised to learn that a watch
is wearing apparel, 83 a piano is household furniture,18 4 a farm
tractor is an implement of husbandry,18 but disappointed that
the family automobile is not a carriage or buggy. 180 Is a valu-
able oil portrait of an important ancestor a family picture?187
In addition to avoiding difficult problems of interpretation,
the Code provision treats equally all to whom it applies.188
Of the family protections conferred by the Code and Ok-
lahoma law, the family allowances are most nearly similar.
Where the Code makes the allowance a matter of right,189 in
Oklahoma it is discretionary with the court should the home-
180 OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 311 (1971).
181 OLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 312 (1971).
182 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1 (1971).
188 In re Carter's Estate, 113 Okla. 182, 240 P. 727 (1925).
18 Cook v. Fuller, 35 Okla. 339, 130 P. 140 (1913).
185 Davis v. Wright, 194 Okla. 451, 152 P.2d 921 (1944).
186 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1 (11) (1971). Automobiles and
other motor vehicles are not exempt property. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 31, § 8 (1971). The surviving spouse of an intestate is
entitled to an automobile owned by the decedent, though it
is not exempt from creditors' claims. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84,
§ 232 (1971).
18 7 See 1 R. HuFF, supra note 143, at 188.
'.
8 The Commissioners stress that exemptions and allowances
should apply only to domiciliaries. IPC, art. II, pt. 4, Gen-
eral Comment.
180 UPC § 2-403.
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stead and exempt property be insufficient for maintenance
of the family.190 Under the Code the allowance has priority
over all claims except homestead allowance;19' in Oklahoma,
funeral charges and expenses of administration are prefer-
red. 92 In both systems the amount of the allowance is based
largely on the previous standard of living of the family.
93
The Code permits consideration of the surviving spouse's other
income in setting the amount of the allowance; 9 4 apparently
Oklahoma does not.195 A Code allowance in excess of five hun-
dred dollars per month can be made only by order of court.196
In neither system can the allowance continue for longer than
one year if the estate is insolvent; 97 neither allowance quali-
fies for the estate tax marital deduction. 98 The Code provid-
es that the family allowance is in addition to other benefits
unless the decedent's will provides otherwise; 99 it may be
an absolute right in Oklahoma.2 00
Because it uses dollar figures for the homestead and ex-
empt property allowances, the Code provides that property
specifically devised is not to be used to satisfy those rights if
190 OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 314 (1971). But see In r.e Still's Estate,
117 Cal. 509, 49 P. 463 (1897).
""'UPC § 2-403.
192 OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 315 (1971).
193 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 314 (1971); Barry v. Phillips, 329
P.2d 1046 (Okla. 1958); UPC § 2-403, Comment.
1UPC § 2-403, Comment.
2951n re Finston's Estate, 288 P.2d 383 (Okla. 1955); In re
Crane's Estate, 201 Okla. 354, 206 P.2d 726 (1949). OKLA.
STAT. tit. 58, § 318 (1971) apparently prefers the minor
children over the widow only in regard to the setting apart
of exempt personal property not subject to levy and execu-
tion. 1 R. HuFF, supra note 143, at 201.
I9M UPC § 2-403, Comment; UPC § 2-404.
197 OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 314 (1971); UPC § 2-403.
29 8 Darby's Estate v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1963);
UPC § 2-403, Comment.
199 See UPC § 2-403.
200 See 1 R. HUFF, supra note 143, at 187; cf. In re Rossiter's
Estate, 191 Okla. 342, 129 P.2d 856 (1942).
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the estate is otherwise sufficient.20 1 Subject to this restriction,
however, a selection of property may be made by the person
entitled to homestead or exempt property.20 2
Part 5. Wills
The provisions of the Uniform Probate Code relating to
capacity and formalities of will execution and revocation seek
to validate a will whenever possible.203 Consequently adoption
of the Code would have the effect of softening some of the
more stringent requirements of Oklahoma law in this area.
The Oklahoma requirement that a testator publish his
will to two attesting witnesses and that they sign in his pres-
ence20 4 would be eliminated. Under the Code the testator need
only acknowledge to the witnesses that the signature is his
or that the document is his will.20 5 Nor does the Code require
the testator's signature to be at the end of the will. 20 0 Both
systems, however, permit self-proved wills.20 7
A holographic will under the Code is valid if the signature
and the material provisions of the will are in the testator's
handwriting.208 "A valid holograph might even be executed on
some printed will forms if the printed portion could be elim-
inated and the handwritten portion could evidence the testa-
tor's will."20 9 Oklahoma, on the other hand, requires not only
that the document be entirely written by the testator but
that it also be dated.210
201UPC § 2-404.
202 1d.
203 See UPC, art. II, pt. 5, General Comment.
204 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 55 (4) (1971).
205 UPC § 2-502; id., Comment.
206 UPC § 2-502, Comment. Contra, OLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 55 (1)
(1971).
207 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 55 (5) (1971); UPC § 2-504.
208 UPC § 2-503.
209 Id., Comment.
2 1 0 OLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 54 (1971).
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The Code provides that any person generally competent
to be a witness may witness a will and that no provision of a
will is invalid because of attestation by an interested wit-
ness. 211 Although they discourage the use of interested wit-
nesses, the Commissioners recognize that a requirement of dis-
interested witnesses has not succeeded in preventing fraud and
undue influence.212 The test in Oklahoma of the competency
of a witness to a will is his competency to testify in court. It
is to the statutes on civil procedure that one must look to de-
termine a witness' competency.2 3 Thus if the spouse of a
devisee has attested a will and his testimony is necessary to
prove it, the will cannot be admitted to probate.2 14 On the
other hand if the testimony of an otherwise competent wit-
ness is required to prove the will, he will lose the benefits
conferred on him by the will 21 r unless he is also an heir at
law. If he is an heir, he will receive the lesser of the will
benefits or his intestate share.216
Oklahoma has broad choice of law rules concerning the
validity of a will. It is valid if executed in compliance with
Oklahoma law, the law of the place where it was executed, or
the law of the testator's domicile at the time of execution. 21 7
211 UPC § 2-505.
212 Id., Comment.
218 1 R. HUFF, OKLAHO_ PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 146,
at 91 (1957).214 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385 (1971); In re Purcell's Estate,
198 Okla. 166, 176 P.2d 986 (1947).
215 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 143 (1971).
216 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 144 (1971).
217 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § § 71-72 (1971). A change of domicile
will not affect the validity of a previously executed will.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 73 (1971). See generally Succes-
sion, Probate, and Administration of Decedents' Estates in
Symposium on Conflicts of Law in Oklahoma, 18 OKLA. L.
REv. 379, 462 (1965).
The choice of law provisions also cover will revocation.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, 55 71-73 (1971). The Uniform Probate
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The Code not only adopts these references but also adds the
law of testator's domicile at death and the law of the place
where, at execution or death, the testator has a place of abode
or is a national.218
There are no significant differences in Oklahoma law
and the Code on will revocation. 19 Revival of revoked wills,
however, appears to be more liberal under the Code. Where
a second will, revoking a first will in whole or in part, is itself
revoked, the Code provides that "the first will is revoked in
whole or in part unless it is evident from the circumstances
of the revocation of the second will or from testator's con-
temporary or subsequent declarations that he intended the
first will take effect as executed. ' 220 In Oklahoma, a revival
of the former will can be accomplished only by republication
of it, "unless it appears by the terms of such revocation [of
the second will] that it was [testator's] intention to renew
the former will .... -221 The prevailing view of courts inter-
preting a statute similar to Oklahoma's seems to be that the
language "by the terms of such revocation" refers only to re-
vocation by an attested writing and that the testator's inten-
tion to revive his former will cannot rest in parol.222 It appears
218 UPC § 2-506.
219 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 101-03, 105, 112-13 (1971); UPC
§ 2-507. Revocation of wills executed in duplicate, see OKLA.
STAT. tit. 84, § 104 (1971), is not covered in the Code. Both
systems provide partial revocation by operation of law of
all will benefits in favor of a subsequently divorced spouse,
though the Code revives those benefits in case the testator
and his former spouse remarry. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84,
§ 114 (1971); UPC § 2-508. See note 217 supra.
220 UPC § 2-509 (a). Revocation of a second will by a third
will does not revive a first will, "except to the extent it
appears from the terms of the third will that the testator
intended the first will to take effect." UPC § 2-509 (b).
221 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 106 (1971).
222 See T. ATKInsoN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 92, at
477-78 (2d ed. 1953).
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that Oklahoma would subscribe to the prevailing view.223 By
admitting parole evidence, the Code would allow the testa-
tor's true intention concerning the status of a former will to
be ascertained.
The two systems permit matters outside the will to be
given effect in the disposition of a testator's property. Both
incorporate the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts
Act.224 The doctrine of incorporation by reference, codified by
the Code,225 is part of Oklahoma's common law.226 Property
may be disposed of conditionally 2 27 or by reference to events
of independent significance.228 The Code has an additional de-
sirable provision, however, not present in Oklahoma law. Re-
flecting "the broader policy of effectuating a testator's intent
and of relaxing formalities of execution, 229 the Code permits
a testator to refer in his will to a separate document disposing
of tangible personalty, excluding money, evidences of indebt-
edness, documents of title, securities, and property used in
trade or business. If the document is in the testator's hand-
writing or signed by him and describes the property and the
intended recipients, it will be given effect. It is immaterial
that the document is prepared before or after the execution
of the will or is altered from time to time.230 The provision
would be of immeasurable value to the lawyer in the typical
case of a client who has frequent changes of mind as to the
disposition of his personal effects.
Oral, or nuncupative, wills are not permitted by the Code.
Although they are recognized in Oklahoma, the severe re-
strictions on the amount of property that can be bequeathed,
223 See Puckett v. Brittain, 152 Okla. 184, 3 P.2d 876 (1931).
224 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 301-04 (1971); UPC § 2-511.
225 UPC § 2-510.
220 See Johnson v. Johnson, 279 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1954).
227 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 179-83 (1971).
228 UPC § 2-512.
22 TPC § 2-513, Comment.
23 0UPC § 2-513; id., Comment.
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the narrow conditions under which they can be made, and
the problems of proving them231 make them of little conse-
quence. m2
Part 6. Rules of Construction
A will is interpreted to give effect to the testator's inten-
tion.2 3 In the absence of a contrary intention expressed in a
will, however, courts apply statutory rules of construction as
presumptive of the testator's intention.234 Thus a statutory rule
may be avoided by the testator's manifesting a different in-
tention.
As it does in the case of intestate succession,233 the Code
provides that "[a] devisee who does not survive the testator
by 120 hours is treated as if he predeceased the testator .... 1 230
The provision is not given effect, however, if the will explic-
itly deals with simultaneous or common-disaster deaths or
otherwise requires survival.2 7 Oklahoma does not have a
comparable provision.
The Code permits a testator to select the local law of any
state to govern the meaning and legal effect of dispositions in
his will. That law will be followed unless it is contrary to the
otherwise applicable public policy of the Code state;23 8 the lo-
cation of the property disposed of is immaterial.23 9 Oklahoma
has the traditional rule that a will, as it relates to disposition
of Oklahoma land is interpreted according to its law, but that
a will relating to personal property disposition is interpreted
according to the law of the testator's domicile.240
O'See OKLA. STAT. fit. 58, §§ 91-93 (1971); tit. 84, §§ 46, 51
(1971).232 See generally 1 R. HuFF, supra note 213, at § 141.
23 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 151 (1971); UPC § 2-603.
24 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 153 (1971); UPC § 2-603.
25 See notes 95-99 supra and accompanying text.
6 UPC § 2-601.
237 Id.
238 UPC § 2-602.
239 Id., Comment.
240 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 20 (1971).
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Both systems have the usual rule that property acquired
after the execution of the will is passed by it.241
There are significant differences in the anti-lapse provis-
ions of the two systems. In Oklahoma when a will beneficiary
dies before the testator, the gift to him lapses unless the will
provides otherwise or unless it is saved by the anti-lapse stat-
ute.242 That statute243 prevents lapse of a devise "to any child
or other relation of the testator" who leaves lineal descendants.
Its full meaning is not entirely clear.244 It appears however
that a devise to one already dead at the time of execution of
the will is void245 and is thus not saved by the anti-lapse
sfatute. The void devise is explicitly saved from lapse by the
Code. It, too, restricts anti-lapse to issue of blood relatives of
the testator; however, in line with the intestate distribution
section, the relative can be no more remote than a grandpar-
ent or a lineal descendant of a grandparent. Furthermore, the
person who would take in lieu of his ancestor must survive
the testator by one hundred twenty hours. And finally, the
anti-lapse section is made expressly applicable to class gifts, 246
a point on which no Oklahoma cases have been decided.
If a clause in a will, other than a residuary clause, fails
and is not saved from lapse, the property devised becomes
part of the residue.247 If a residuary clause fails completely, the
residue passes by intestacy.248 In Oklahoma if the residue is
devised to two or more persons not as joint tenants or members
of a class, and if one of those persons predeceases the testator
and the devise is not saved from lapse, that portion of the
241 OKMA. STAT. tit. 84, § 146 (1971); UPC § 2-604.
24 2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 177 (1971).
248 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 142 (1971).
244 See generally 1 R. HUFF, supra note 213, at § 58.
245 See In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973 (1937).
2 46 UPC § 2-605; id., Comment.
24 7 UPC § 2-606 (a); see In re Estate of He-ah-to-me, 325 P.2d
746 (Okla. 1958).248 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213 (1971); UPC § 2-101.
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residue which failed does not accrue to the benefit of other
residuary devisees but passes to the testator's heirs by in-
testacy.249 The Code, on the other hand, provides that the share
passes "to other residuary devisees in proportion to their in-
terests in the residue.' '250
Recognizing that changes in and accessions to securities
specifically devised are frequent sources of litigation,251 the
Code contains a section spelling out the rights of the specific
devisee.252 It further provides for limited nonademption in
cases where property specifically devised is sold by a con-
servator and where a condemnation award or fire or casualty
insurance proceeds in relation to that property are paid a con-
servator.253 However, in the case of an unprotected testator,
Oklahoma and the Code apparently follow the same ademption
rule.254
The Code provides that "[a] specific devise passes subject
to any security interest existing at the date of death, without
right of exoneration, regardless of a general directive in the
will to pay debts,"255 thus reversing the common law rule.25 0
Oklahoma has a rule of nonexoneration of mortgages on re-
alty,257 though it does not extend to mechanics' and material-
men's liens258 nor, by its terms, to personalty.
In Oklahoma a will with a general residuary clause is
interpreted to exercise any testamentary power of appointment
249In re Estate of Levy, 415 P.2d 1006 (Okla. 1966); Dean v.
Moore, 380 P.2d 934 (Okla. 1962).
250 UPC § 2-606 (b).
251 See generally T. ATKnsoN, supra note 222, at § 135.
252 UPC § 2-607. Apparently Oklahoma has similar legislation
only in regard to trusts. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § § 175.28-
.29 (1971).253 See UPC § 2-608.
254 See id.; In re Barry's Estate, 252 P.2d 437 (Okla. 1952).
255 UPC § 2-609.
256 See generally T. ATKnmioN, supra note 222, at § 137.
257 OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 5 (1971).
258 Bethel v. Magness, 296 P.2d 792 (Okla. 1956).
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held by the testator.259 The Code adopts the opposite rule un-
less in the will "specific reference is made to the power or
there is some other indication of intention to include the prop-
erty subject to the power."260 Thus, surrounding circumstances
may evidence an intent to exercise the power. In stressing the
need for uniformity in the exercise of powers by will, the Com-
missioners give two reasons for the Code rule-that it is the
majority rule and that, as most powers are created in marital
deduction trusts, the donor would prefer that the property pass
under his trust in the absence of a specific exercise of the
power by the donee.261
In order to facilitate the determination of persons to be
included in the disposition of property to a class, the Code
incorporates for wills its rules for determining relationships
for purposes of intestate succession.262 Oklahoma prescribes
the legal effect to be accorded certain terms, such as "heirs",
"relations", "issue" and the like.263 The statutes may be consid-
ered on the presumption that the testator knew of them; how-
ever, it is his intention as to the meaning of the terms used
that controls.264
Satisfaction of legacies is similar in the two systems. Okla-
homa provides that the testator's intention that a lifetime gift
be in satisfaction of a legacy must be expressed by him in writ-
ing;26 the Code requires that the testator's intention be ex-
pressed in his will or a contemporaneous writing or indicated
in the donee's written acknowledgement of the gift.266
259 See OiLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 164 (1971).
20 JUPC § 2-610.
261 See id., Comment.
212 See UPC § 2-611. See notes 56-57, 69-72, 77-78, 81-83 supra
and accompanying text.
213 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 168-69 (1971); see OKLA. STAT. tit.
25, § 7 (1971).
204 See In re Estate of Ware, 348 P.2d 176 (Okla. 1958). See
notes 233-34 supra and accompanying text.
205 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 185 (1971).
266 UPC § 2-612.
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The Oklahoma chapter on will interpretation 6 7 contains
a number of detailed rules which have no parallel in the Code.
As they seem generally to be codifications of the common law,
their retention or elimination would appear tO have no delet-
erious effect on the adoption of the Code.
Part 7. Contractual Arrangements Relating to Death
This part of the Code contains only one section:
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to
revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate ... can be
established only by (1) provisions of a will stating
material provisions of the contract; (2) an express
reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evi-
dence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a
writing signed by the decedent evidencing the con-
tract. The execution of a joint will or mutual wills
does not create a presumption of a contract not to
revoke the will or wills. 26 8
The stated purpose of the section clearly is "to tighten the
methods by which contracts concerning succession may be
proved."26 9 "Oral testimony regarding the contract is permit-
ted if the will makes reference to the contract, but this pro-
vision is not intended to affect normal rules regarding admis-
sibility of evidence."270 Adoption of the Code provision appar-
ently would reverse the rule in cases such as Johnson v. Haza-
eus.271 In that case a purported holographic will was not ad-
mitted to probate because it lacked dating; there is no indi-
cation that the "will" mentioned the existence of a contract.
Nonetheless the proponent-beneficiary was able to prove the
existence of an oral contract to devise, and the "will" was ad-
mitted as evidence relevant to that issue. Tucker v. Zachary272
267 OLA. STAT. tit. 84, ch. 3 (1971).
268 UPC § 2-701.
269 Id., Comment.
270 Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the operation of a dead man's
statute, see, e.g., OKrA. STAT. tit. 12, § 384 (1971), should
not be affected.
271 338 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1959).
272 269 P.2d 773 (Okla. 1954).
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involved a "joint" holographic will, written and signed by the
wife and also signed by the husband, and leaving their prop-
erty to foster daughters. The wife, as to whom the will was
valid, died about one hour before the husband, as to whom
the "will" could not be probated. The foster daughters were
able to prove that the "will" was executed pursuant to an
oral contract for their benefit. If the "will" had not "evidenced
the contract,"273 the Code apparently would have precluded
recovery. In any event, the Code should prevent recovery in
contract where the contract and the evidence of it rest entirely
in parol. The current Oklahoma rule that full performance by
one of the parties to the oral contract removes it from the
Statute of Frauds274 would be eliminated by the Code's writing
requirement. Thus the Code would reduce the amount of oral
contract litigation,275 although the action in quasi contract for
quantum meruit apparently is preserved.
Part 8. General Provisions
"Although present law in all states permits renunciation
of a devise under a will, the common law did not permit re-
nunciation of an intestate share."2 76 If an intestate share is
"renounced", the "renunciation" constitutes a transfer of prop-
erty which may be subject to the imposition of gift taxes,
whereas the renunciation of benefits under a will is not sub-
ject to be taxed.277 Since the distinction "cannot be defended
on policy grounds" 278 and in order to facilitate estate plan-
ning,270 the Code permits renunciation of testate and intestate
273 See text accompanying note 268 supra.
-
2T4 See Robinson v. Haynes, 147 Okla. 95, 294 P. 803 (1930);
Eggstaff v. Phelps, 99 Okla. 54, 226 P. 82 (1924) (oral adop-
tion contract).
275 See TJPC § 2-701, Comment.
276 UPC § 2-801, Comment.
277 See Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
278 UPC, art. I, pt. 8, General Comment.
279 UPC § 2-801, Comment.
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benefits2 0 and provides that "the renunciation relates back
for all purposes to the date of death of the decedent .... ,,281
In addition it is provided that the renunciation may be in
whole or in part,28 2 thus changing the rule that inseparable
benefits under a will must be totally accepted or totally
renounced.2 3 Furthermore the presence of a spendthrift pro-
vision "will not affect the expanded right to renounce. 284 The
right to renounce must be exercised within six months of de-
cedent's death or the time the taker is ascertained, 28 , and
the property will pass as if the renouncer predeceased the
decedent unless a will otherwise provides.280
Will provisions in favor of a spouse are revoked by a sub-
sequent divorce or annulment by Oklahoma law2B7 and the
Code.288 The Code, however, expands this principle by creating
an estoppel in certain cases, for example, where a divorce or
annulment decree may be held invalid, not only to revoke
will benefits but also to terminate all statutory rights of a
surviving spouse.8 9 No person is a surviving spouse who ob-
tains or consents to a divorce or annulment, even though the
decree is not recognized in the Code-enacting state, unless the
spouses subsequently remarry or live together as man and
wife.290 All benefits are terminated where the decedent ob-
tained a divorce or annulment and the ex-spouse marries an-
280 See UPC § 2-801 (a).
281 UPC § 2-801 (c).
282 UPC § 2-801 (a).
283 See State Banking Co. v. Hinton, 178 Ga. 68, 172 S.E. 42
(1933).
284 See UPC § 2-801 (e).
285 UPC § 2-801 (b).
286 UPC § 2-801 (c).
287 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 114 (1971).
288 UPC § 2-508. See note 219 supra.
289 See UPC § 2-802; id., Comment.
-0 See UPC § 2-802 (b) (1). Common law marriage is rec-
ognized in Oklahoma. See Aurand v. Aurand, 195 Okla. 643,
161 P.2d 857 (1945); In re Love's Estate, 42 Okla. 478, 142
P. 305 (1914).
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other person.291 Finally, although a legal separation normally
does not affect succession rights,292 being a party to any valid
proceeding in which all marital property rights are terminated
by court order will create an estoppel to claiming all succes-
sion rights based on the marriage relation.293
The Code contains an optional section which prevents a
person who feloniously and intentionally kills another from
taking any benefits which might accrue because of the death.294
Although similar to Oklahoma's statute, 95 the Code has sig-
nificant differences. Oklahoma's law applies expressly only
to interests in the decedent's estate and insurance proceeds;296
the Code not only includes these items but expressly adds
property held in any form of co-ownership with survivorship
rights, beneficiaries of bonds or other contractual arangements,
and generally any other acquisition of property or interest by
the killer because of the death.2 97 While Oklahoma requires
a conviction of murder or manslaughter in the first degree for
the statute to become operative, 298 the Code makes such a
conviction conclusive but not the only means of coming within
the section's application. "In the absence of a conviction of
felonious and intentional killing the Court may determine by
a preponderance of evidence whether the killing was felonious
and intentional for purposes of this section."29 9 Thus, where
the killer has committed suicide or otherwise cannot be or is
not brought to trial, or even in the face of a verdict of acquit-
tal, the court in a probate proceeding may determine that the
section is to be applied.800 The rights of purchasers for value
and without notice of property interests from the killer are
ml UPC § 2-802 (b) (2).202 See UPC § 2-802 (a); UPC § 2-802, Comment.
293 UPC § 2-802 (b) (3); cf. UPC § 2-204.
"4 See UPC § 2-803.
295 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (1971).
296 See id.
297 See UPC § 2-803.
298 See OxLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (1971).
299 UPC § 2-803 (e).
800 See UPC § 2-803, Comment.
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protected, as are obligors making payment to the killer with-
out notice of a claim under the section.301
Part 9. Custody and Deposit of Wills
Both Oklahoma and the Code provide for deposit of wills
for safekeeping with an appropriate court. 02 The duties of the
court in regard to a will's confidentiality and delivery are
similar.303 The Code does provide, however, that a conservator
may examine the will of a protected testator under Court pro-
cedures which will maintain its confidentiality insofar as is
possible.304
Both systems also place a duty on the custodian of a will
after notice of the testator's death to deliver the will to a
person able to secure its probate or to the appropriate court
and provide that damages occasioned by a failure to deliver
are assessable.305 In addition the court may compel delivery
of a will and punish a recalcitrant for contempt of court.)0
The foregoing comparison of what perhaps may best be
called the substantive provisions of wills and estate law might
tend to suggest to many that Oklahoma would benefit from
a re-examination of its law in light of the philosophy and
thought which went into the drafting of the Uniform Probate
Code. By such an examination it can be determined whether
Oklahoma law still today is successful in achieving what should
be its ultimate goal - that family protection in the devolution
of his property which best effectuates the probable expecta-
tions and intentions of Oklahoma decedents.
Part II of this study will examine the procedures for con-
cluding a decedent's affairs and transferring his property to
others, as well as non-probate transfers and trust administra-
tion.
801 UPC § 2-803 (f). Oklahoma law also provides the latter
protection. OxLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (1971).
302 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 81 (1971); UPC § 2-901.
303 See OKiA. STAT. tit. 84, § 81-83 (1971); UPC § 2-901.
304 TPC § 2-901.
305OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 21 (1971); UPC § 2-902.
300 OHLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 24 (1971); UPC § 2-902.
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